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Preface
This work attempts to capture the critical issues plaguing Cuba’s continual economic
dependency and suggests potential avenues for greater foreign direct investment. For the past
year, I have been working to develop a framework to assess the current state of the Cuban
economy in relation to foreign investment. However, I must acknowledge a few key
limitations of my research. First, Cuba’s economic data is scarce and has often been criticized
as unreliable or contradictory. Second, as Cuba operates a dual currency system, the actual
cost and value of goods is difficult to calculate since the currencies trade at an artificial and
fluctuating exchange rate. Third, bias of official reporting of Cuban economic studies and
statistics is rampant and difficult to gauge: the Castro government has a long history of
internal disagreement regarding the interpretation of official data. This has resulted over the
years in extremely divergent and even contradictory official economic analyses.
In light of these limitations, I will utilize Cuba’s National Office of Information and
Statistics’ annual reports as they provide the most informative reporting of economic data,
albeit vague and difficult to interpret at times. In addition, I will draw upon the economic
reports published by the Center for the Study of the Cuban Economy, an influential policy
center in Havana. During my research stint in Havana I had the opportunity to spend a week
at the Center’s library and immerse myself in the current writings on the domestic economy,
and I will include firsthand accounts of this experience. Through a mix of first and
secondhand accounts, I will provide an overview of the history of Cuban economic
dependency, its implications, an assessment of the current reforms and the potential for future
foreign investment in Cuba.
I wish to express my sincere appreciation to the Center for the Study of Cuban
Economy’s Director Dr. Omar Everleny for his hospitality and cordiality during my visit. I
would also like to thank Dr. Felix Valdes who introduced me to Dr. Omar Everleny,
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coordinated my independent study of the Cuban economy in Havana, and offered me ample
resources for my research project. I would like to recognize Dr. Julie Bunck for her assistance
as the faculty advisor for this project. Dr. Bunck’s previous works on Fidel Castro and Cuba
inspired my special interest in the Cuban economy, leading me to a research proposal that
was the foundation of this thesis. In a similar vein, my time researching in Cuba would not
have been possible without the financial support of various entities and people. I am grateful
for Dr. Patricia Condon’s enthusiasm and support of my research and the generous funding
awarded to me by the University of Louisville Honors Program through the Irvin F. and Alice
S. Etscorn International Summer Research Award. I thank David and Betty Jones for their
consistent promotion of a global education through generous funding initiatives. I would like
to acknowledge Dr. Gary Gregg and the McConnell Center for their continued investments in
my education. Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to Glyptus Grider-Jones,
Elizabeth Liebschutz, Dr. Tricia Gray, and Dr. John Gibson.
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I. Introduction

After fifty years of governance within a closed economic system, Cuba has initiated a
move to integrate into the world market. With its current economy nearing complete
bankruptcy, however, lingering international distrust, as a result of its complete
nationalization without compensation of foreign and domestic businesses in the 1960s, and
suspicion about the accuracy of the government’s current official economic statistics, many
multinational businesses remain wary of investing significantly in Cuba. Moreover, the U.S.
embargo against Cuba places major restrictions on the import and export of goods and limits
most Americans from traveling to Cuba unless they have a legal purpose for doing so.
While many adverse conditions still exist for foreign investment in Cuba, the island’s
government has implemented a new foreign investment law that would greatly benefit
multinational corporations and attempts to foster an environment of support for public-private
partnerships.1 Since President Raul Castro has stated that he will not remain at the head of
state for long, and Cuban leaders assume that the embargo will soon be lifted, government
officials are scrambling to transition the economy in preparation for these events. In reaction
to these realities, economists in Cuba and abroad have set out to create a framework for
assessing Cuba’s economic future and to develop meaningful comparisons to other
transitional economies. The goal of these studies is to find an economic path that is both
sustainable and effective.
To begin, this paper will carefully assess the prospects of foreign investment in Cuba.
Next, the paper presents a review of the relevant literature in the field of developmental and
Caribbean economics. Finally, the third section will present a historical overview of both
Cuba’s long-enduring economic dependency and the more recent reforms of Raul Castro and

1

Law No. 118 Foreign Investment Act. National People’s Power Assembly. Mar. 29, 2014.
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an analysis of the current economy in relation to the goals of the revolution. From this
intensive historical and present-day study of the economy, the future prospects of the
economy will be considered leading to in-depth examination of the advantages and
disadvantages of foreign investment. A brief conclusion will summate this paper and close
with a personal anecdote emblematic of Cuba’s future.

II. Relevant Literature
The Plantation Economy

Lloyd Best and Kari Levitt’s Essays on the Theory of Plantation Economy develops a
new conceptualization of the Caribbean economy. Through of a series of complex case
studies, the authors offer an ideological alternative to neo-liberalization and promote a
different understanding of the Caribbean region. Their perspective of the plantation economy
argues that the economies of Caribbean islands are fairly homogenous – detailing similarities
among Cuba, Trinidad and Tobago, and the Dominican Republican – and lays out a system of
reasoning for why the region should be viewed differently than the rest of the world. 2 The
theory of the plantation economy originates from the historically agricultural-based system
reliant on slave labor, which was more lucrative for the investing state, Spain, than the
domestic workers. The centuries of exploitation points to a systemic phenomenon that favors
an imbalance of trade, creating an economic dependency model. The theory of plantation
economy’s structural approach attempts to explain why the Caribbean islands “undergo
alternating cycles of ‘boom’ and ‘bust’, why periods of boom are not self-sustaining, and why
adjustment during the bust does not free the economy from dependence.”3
2

Best, Lloyd, and Kari Levitt. Essays on the Theory of Plantation Economy: A Historical and Institutional
Approach to Caribbean Economic Development. Kingston, Jamaica: U of West Indies, 2009.
3
Given, Norman. "The Plantation Economy in the Age of Globalization." Rpt. in Essays on the Theory of
Plantation Economy. U of the West Indies, 2009.

Moore 7

The plantation economy, in short, represents the foreign-owned and export-oriented
sector, and key examples are agriculture, mining, and tourism. The link to both slavery and
exploitation by the foreign sovereign can easily be found in all of these sectors, and until a
Caribbean economy diminishes these areas and replaces them with residentiary sectors like
manufacturing, foreign dependency will sharply characterize the economic fate of the island.
In Best and Levitt’s interpretation, the theory of plantation economy does not embrace a
fatalistic approach; instead it presents a method of re-conceptualizing the Caribbean
structural approach to economics in order to explain the historical difficulties that these
economically homogenous countries have faced as they attempt to modernize and become
more independent and self-sufficient. Although the essays were written more than 50 years
ago, the same issues are still present in Cuba. It has not advanced its residentiary sector, and
it maintains a strong reliance on its plantation economy as the basis of an export-oriented,
foreign-dependent economy. Past examples of the adverse effects of this overreliance are
plentiful.
Import-Substitution Industrialization

Related to the theory of plantation economy but more expansive in terms of regional
and global inclusion, import-substitution industrialization is a structural approach to
economics that attempts to explain what policies account for the difference between
developed and developing nations. In other words, the import-substitution model addresses
the systemic issues that lead to mass poverty in low-income nations.4 The long-term cause is
generally linked to the dominance of agriculture or mining in an exploited country as opposed

4

Bruton, Henry J.. “A Reconsideration of Import Substitution”. Journal of Economic Literature 36.2 (1998): 904.
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to the diversified, service-based economy of an industrialized country.5 Linus Thomas’
review of Raul Prebisch’s economic development theory reinforces this root cause:
A disproportionate amount of the benefits of technological progress seemed to accrue
to the Center [developed countries] leaving the periphery [underdeveloped countries]
with nothing but labor-intensive activities. Since labor is generally abundant in these
economies, the rewards for technological improvements are very low in both
production of the traditional goods and the emerging manufacturing industries.6
Since the global economic paradigm concentrates technological and capital advancements in
industrialized countries, low-income countries struggle to grow – only attracting industries
that need inexpensive labor – and ultimately lack highly profitable manufacturing and
service-based firms.7
The theory suggests that these countries should invest in replacing imports by
manufacturing them domestically and setting up trade barriers to protect these industries
against the better established companies in high-income countries. After World War II, many
countries of Latin America actively implemented state-sponsored policies of importsubstitution industrialization as they sought to escape the market volatility they suffered
during the first half of the twentieth century and to avoid the devastating impact of another
Great Depression. Economic analyses, including critiques and reconsiderations of these
policies have proliferated over the last several decades.8
Common aspects of these essays support a few weaknesses and strengths of importsubstitution industrialization. In most cases, gross domestic product increased, but the growth

5

Ibid. 904.
Thomas, Linus J.. “Neoclassical Development Theory and the Prebisch Doctrine: A Synthesis”. The American
Economist 38.1 (1994): 77.
7
Bruton, Henry J.. “A Reconsideration of Import Substitution”. Journal of Economic Literature 36.2 (1998): 904.
8
Baer, Werner. “Import Substitution and Industrialization in Latin America: Experiences and
Interpretations”. Latin American Research Review 7.1 (1972): 95–122. Bruton, Henry J.. “A Reconsideration of
Import Substitution”. Journal of Economic Literature 36.2 (1998): 903–936. Thomas, Linus J.. “Neoclassical
Development Theory and the Prebisch Doctrine: A Synthesis”. The American Economist 38.1 (1994): 75–81.
Hirschman, Albert O. 1968. The Political Economy of Import-Substituting Industrialization in Latin
America. Quarterly Journal of Economics 82, 1: 1–32. Krueger, Anne O. "Trade Policy as an Input to
Development." The American Economic Review, Vol. 70, No. 2, (May 1980), pp. 288-292.
6
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did not keep up with the accumulated foreign debt that was required to carry out these
sweeping reforms and take on the various capital projects needed to make goods
domestically. The import of needed capital goods alone often outweighed the profits made
from the product. In addition, the quality of domestically made goods were often well below
international standards while their prices were well above. The attempt by some countries to
make automobiles demonstrates well this set of problems:
A study by Baranson of automobile industries in developing countries (which includes
information on Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico)… finds that among the main
deficiencies are ‘… underdeveloped supplier capacities, inadequate quality control
systems, and a dearth of qualified technicians and managers…’ Thus, Baranson found
that many ‘… basic materials that are considered standard stock in open economies
often must be procured locally or specially ordered in small batches at considerably
higher cost or at inferior quality... Lack of uniformity in raw materials and semifinished goods such as castings and forgings creates special problems in milling and
machining to required specifications. In high-volume production, precision and
uniformity are built into automated equipment. Developing countries with limited
markets are much more dependent upon the very machine labor skills in which they
are deficient.’ Also, considering the many parts which go into an automobile,
Baranson found that outside plant procurement averages about 60 per cent by value in
advanced economies, while in countries like Mexico and Brazil this factor amounts to
only 40 per cent. Such a condition further reduces the possibility of economies of
large scale production. As a result, Baranson found that factory costs in Argentina,
Brazil, and Mexico were about 60 per cent to 150 per cent higher than in the United
States.9
This evaluation of a specific sector yields critical data needed to surmise the usefulness of
import-substitution industrialization. First, the automobile industry serves as a failed
experiment of import-substitution, and from a cost perspective, it highlights the difficulty of
competing with highly advanced countries and the importance of economies of scale. Closing
the domestic economy by adding tariffs eliminates foreign competition, thereby, creating
inefficiencies in the market. Moreover, as a country creates tariffs and prevents imports from
flowing into the state, it simultaneously limits its economic potential for exports: “A country

9

Baer, Werner. “Import Substitution and Industrialization in Latin America: Experiences and
Interpretations”. Latin American Research Review 7.1 (1972): 104-105.
Baranson, Jack. Automotive Industries in Developing Countries. (Baltimore 1969). 25-26.
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that is closed for imports is closed for exports.”10 Although a negative for the global
economy, protectionism in certain cases helps a developing country scale its production of a
good in order to compete globally eventually.
Another takeaway from the Latin American experience involves the importance of
local raw materials and resources. Countries without the necessary raw materials for
production must make trade deals to acquire them. This reveals several key drawbacks.
First, it makes the finished product susceptible to the volatile commodity prices of the
intermediate goods. Second, the country requires proper supply-chain management in order
to avoid major shortages and surpluses of raw materials. Third, the state needs scale to
negotiate a better price for the raw material, or the cost will be too great to compete with
advanced countries that receive or extract the materials for a much cheaper price. These
lessons must be heeded for an import-substitution model to function properly. The Latin
American example of import-substitution as a whole “was indiscriminate, that is, there were
not attempts to concentrate on industrial sectors which might have had a potential
comparative advantage.”11 Coupled with the economic shortages was widespread official
corruption that resulted in the waste of a staggering of money and resources. General
widespread state mismanagement generally added to the failure.

Comparative Advantage – Export Oriented Industrialization

The basis of comparative advantage relies on the principle that goods and services
have factor intensities and are either capital-intensive or labor-intensive, and as such, a

10

Feinberg, Richard, and Ted Piccone. Cuba’s Economic Change in Comparative Perspective. Latin America
Initiative Foreign Policy at Brookings, 2014: 73.
11
Baer, Werner. “Import Substitution and Industrialization in Latin America: Experiences and
Interpretations”. Latin American Research Review 7.1 (1972): 98.
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particular location offers optimal production.12 As previously discussed, labor-intensive
goods will generally become associated with poorer countries, and capital intensive-goods
will gravitate toward advanced economies where capital is relatively cheaper. The theory of
comparative advantage supports this simple distribution of production through the concept of
specialization. The economics of trade strongly contradicts a state’s decision to leave the
world market; comparative advantage, from a macro lens, shows that world production
increases when states specialize. While states vary in the degree to which they become better
off from specialization, every state’s economic production should expand as a result. Thus, an
attempt by a state to become completely self-sustaining implies a contraction of its economic
potential. Limiting integration with the global economy might lead to significant
undervaluation of a state’s currency, and the state would be at a disadvantage if it needed
foreign assistance or loans for investment projects. Additionally, the state would need to have
ample raw materials and natural resources or an agreement to receive them. The scarcity of
natural resources, along with random geographic allocation, presents a significant obstacle to
a state that desires to build a self-sustaining economy.
The developing countries that serve as representatives of successful transitions to a
marked level of self-sufficiency tend to be the Southeast Asian countries.13 Protective legal
barriers combined with foreign investment incentives, a commitment to export promotion,
and disciplined, structured management, provided the right balance for the economic growth

12

Widodo, Tri. “Dynamic Comparative Advantages in the ASEAN+3”. Journal of Economic Integration 24.3
(2009): 506.
13
Widodo, Tri. “Dynamic Comparative Advantages in the ASEAN+3”. Journal of Economic Integration 24.3
(2009): 505–529. Le, Quoc-Phuong. “Evaluating Vietnam's Changing Comparative Advantage Patterns”. ASEAN
Economic Bulletin 27.2 (2010): 221–230. Bresnan, John. From Dominoes to Dynamos: The Transformation of
Southeast Asia. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994. Frey, Marc, Ronald W. Pruessen, and Tai
Yong. Tan. The Transformation of Southeast Asia: International Perspectives on Decolonization. Armonk, N.Y.:
M.E. Sharpe, 2003. Jomo K. S. Southeast Asia's Industrialization: Industrial Policy, Capabilities, and
Sustainability. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001. Machikita, Tomohiro, and Yasushi Ueki.
"Measuring and Explaining Innovative Capability: Evidence from Southeast Asia." Asian Economic Policy
Review 10.1 (2015): 152-173
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that these Southeast Asian countries sustained during the late-1900s. Through careful and
thoughtful planning, a diversified economy that invested in sectors associated with strong
comparative advantages, and scrupulous debt accumulation, these countries became advanced
industrialized nations and serve as models for other developing countries.
Economists have carefully studied the economic transitions of Southeast Asian countries and
have found Vietnam to be a potential model of reform for Cuba.14 Kanako Yamaoka makes
the comparison to suggest that a transition to a market-based economy is possible in an
autocratic regime.15 In No More Free Lunch: Reflections on the Cuban Economic Reform
Process and Challenges for Transformation, Pavel Vidal, Omar Everleny and Claes
Brundenius and Doanh Le Dang have all contributed articles on comparisons of Cuba to
Vietnam. Pavel Vidal emphasizes the monetary and financial similarities to Vietnam, and
Omar Everleny connects the foreign direct investment prospects to Vietnam’s successful
transition. Meanwhile Claes Brundenius and Doanh Le Dang focus on entrepreneurship and
small enterprises in relation to Vietnam. Pavel Vidal and Omar Everleny are prolific
economic-policy experts and scholars at the influential Center for the Study of the Cuban
Economy, and their conscious decision to model Cuba’s transition after Vietnam suggests
that future policy decisions will consider Vietnam’s economic past. A critique of the
comparison might argue that the economies are not that similar; for example, “In 1990
Vietnam’s was greater than 40%. By 2012 Vietnam’s [share had fallen] to 19.3%. By
contrast, Cuba’s share of GDP in 2012 was 3.8%.16 In this sense, the distribution of GDP and

14

Brundenius, Claes, and Pérez R. Torres. No More Free Lunch: Reflections on the Cuban Economic Reform
Process and Challenges for Transformation. 2013: 63-82, 129-151, & 173-192.
15
Yamaoka, Kanako. The Feasibility of Cuban Market Economy: A Comparison with Vietnam. Issue brief no.
189. Chiba-Shi Chia Japan: Institute of Developing Economies. Yamaoka, Kanako. Comparison of Two
Remaining Socialist Countries-Cuba and Vietnam: Possibility of Economic Reform in a Socialist Society and Its
Possible Impact. Issue brief no. 07–15. Cambridge, MA: Program on U.S.-Japan Relations, Harvard University,
2007.
16
Betancourt, Roger. “Cuba 2014: A Different Perspective on Cuba’s “Structural” Reforms. Association for the
Study of the Cuban Economy 24 (2014): 96.
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agricultural dependence greatly differs between the two countries, yet that distinction does
not merit ignoring Vietnam as a model – only it suggests a reasonable framing for how to
view Cuba in the context of the Vietnamese transformation.

Foreign Direct Investment - Trust

The theory of plantation economy, import-substitution industrialization and exportorientated industrialization all address the policies that a central government should
implement in order to promote economic growth. A tool that these policies use is foreign
direct investment. Foreign direct investment is “the creation or expansion of firms that
operate across borders.”17 This expansion of firms does not always leave a net benefit on the
economy, and therefore, the state should exercise a modest degree of discretion in shaping a
trade policy to ward off net negative foreign investments.18 Economists disagree on the
premise behind foreign direct investment. One school of thought assumes that “highly
competitive, profit-maximizing firms [seek] to minimize their costs of production.”19
Economists who argue against that assumption generally view foreign direct investment as a
way firms “(1) capture monopoly profits abroad… and/or (2) maintain market positions
abroad as alternative suppliers in the local market itself and in other foreign countries to
become more competitive.”20 Understanding the underlying reason behind a firm’s decision
gives a host country a better chance of attracting foreign direct investment:
Direct investment should be thought of primarily as an issue in industrial
organization, not in capital flow. That is, analysis should focus more on the reasons

17

Froot, Kenneth. Foreign Direct Investment. Chicago: U of Chicago, 1993: 21.
Feinberg, Richard E. The New Cuban Economy: What Roles for Foreign Investment? Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution, 2012: 3.
19
Ray, Edward John. “Foreign Direct Investment in Manufacturing”. Journal of Political Economy 85.2 (1977):
284.
20
Ibid 284.
18
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why multinational firms exist and have advantages than on the international flows of
money per se.21
Although trade and foreign investments are generally viewed by the imports and exports of a
country or its trade balance or imbalance, the necessary component – in terms of analysis – is
the industrial organization. Control over the manufacturing and operations (or the
contracting) of a domestic company poses a difficult choice for firms; however, according to
Kenneth Froot, control over the investment creates a more efficient operation.22 Cuba’s jointventures, therefore, might lead to small inefficiencies, but the domestic profit will generally
offset the loss of production. Economic gains of foreign-direct investment for a host country
include income tax and indirect benefits to the private sector through spill-overs of
productivity.23 The likelihood of foreign direct investment increases in industries that consist
of corporations with strong financial moats: “Where products are differentiated, reputation is
vital, and technology is firm specific and constantly improving.”24 While other companies
and industries might be targets of foreign investment, the majority of firms will have
common links to the previous industry description. A concern of host countries about foreign
direct investment considers how well domestic companies can compete with foreign
subsidiaries. Drawing upon examples from Japan, China and Korea, scholars have shown that
these countries had rigid investment laws that helped protect their local businesses, giving
them time to increase production.25 As for the difficulty of attracting investment, firms
require a concrete reason why they should make foreign investments in a country as opposed
to simply trading with that country:
Direct invest investment will be chosen instead of, or adjunct to, trade only to the
extent that the location offers a substantial advantage to the company. This advantage
may result from the unusual comparative advantage as reflected in lower production
21

Froot, Kenneth. Foreign Direct Investment. Chicago: U of Chicago, 1993: 29.
Ibid 1.
23
Caves, Richard E.. “Multinational Firms, Competition, and Productivity in Host-country
Markets”.Economica 41.162 (1974): 177.
24
Froot, Kenneth. Foreign Direct Investment. Chicago: U of Chicago, 1993: 40.
25
Fukuyama, Francis. Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. New York: Free, 1995: 339.
22
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costs. Barriers to imports or other host-country policy inducements also play a role in
determining the most advantageous location for production.26
In this context, Cuba has strengths for attracting foreign direct investment in three different
categories; 1) its natural resources including mining, potential oil reserves, and its tropical
environment; 2) its highly educated population helps differentiate Cuba’s human capital
especially at its lower relative wages; and 3) Cuba’s market is fairly closed to external agents,
making corporations more apt to attempt to penetrate the market.27
Cuba faces extra obstacles as it attempts to seek out foreign direct investment. Over
the past fifty years, Cuba has acted in bad faith in a variety of ways including the
expropriation of U.S. businesses and the false reporting of its economic data.28 As such, trust
becomes relevant to the discussion of a firm’s willingness to invest in Cuba. Fukuyama
defines trust as “the expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest, and
cooperative behavior, based on commonly shared norms, on the part of other members of the
community.”29
In relation to trust, Fukuyama prescribes social capital as “a capability that arises from the
prevalence of trust in a society.30 States or actors evaluate the social capital of others through
cultural tendencies like historical precedent. Thus, a historical economic review becomes
critical to the evaluation of a country’s ability to attract foreign direct investment. Once trust
has been lost in a society, it is very difficult to regain:
Social capital is like a ratchet that is more easily turned in one direction than another;
it can be dissipated by the actions of governments much more readily than those
governments can build it up again.31

26

Froot, Kenneth. Foreign Direct Investment. Chicago: U of Chicago, 1993: 40-41.
Feinberg, Richard E. The New Cuban Economy: What Roles for Foreign Investment? Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution, 2012: 15.
28
Ibid 19.
29
Fukuyama, Francis. Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. New York: Free, 1995: 26.
30
Ibid 26.
31
Ibid 362.
27
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The lack of social capital makes an investment in Cuba less appealing, and as such, a higher
risk premium must be applied. Since Cuba’s growth potential is high and most of its land
remains untapped, the effect of minimal social capital is rather limited. However, if the
Cuban government continues to expropriate land, cancel contracts, and make foreign
investing difficult, the trust factor’s relative importance will rise exponentially. Even if a
democratic transition takes place, simultaneous capitalistic reforms must also occur in order
to maintain a democratic order and reestablish trust.32 Fukuyama prescribes these capitalistic
reforms as necessary because they help create “firms, entrepreneurs, markets and
competition” through the development of capitalistic institutions, and he points to the
difficulties that the Eastern European countries faced as they attempted to transition into
democracies after the fall of Soviet Union.33 Cuba diverges from these historical examples in
this regard, however.34
Fukuyama’s overall theory of trust does provide a lens through which to see Cuba:
“Low-trust societies, by contrast, must fence in and isolate their workers with a series of
bureaucratic rules.”35 This principle directly reflects the treatment of workers for roughly 20
companies starting in the 1980s and continuing up until Raul came to power. Fukuyama, a
staunch proponent of capitalism who proclaimed the “unabashed victory of economic and
political liberalism,” suggests that a low-trust society needs “a more intrusive, rule-making
government to regulate social relations.”36 In that sense, a state-controlled economy has its
advantages domestically and internationally when it has a history of actions that jeopardizes

32

Ibid 356.
Ibid 356.
34
Ritter, Archibald R., Ted Henken. Entrepreneurial Cuba: The Changing Policy Landscape. First Forum Press,
11/2014.
35
Fukuyama, Francis. Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. New York: Free, 1995: 28.
36
Fukuyama, Francis. “The End of History?” The National Interest 16 (1989): 3.
Fukuyama, Francis. Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. New York: Free, 1995: 361.
33
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its social capital. The disadvantages of a command economy with low social capital are that
most of its companies will be inefficient and corruption will rise.37
Political risk also plays a critical role in the pursuit of foreign direct investment since
“The absence of supranational courts limits legal remedies and where an investor’s foreign
nationality limits redress through domestic political institutions.”38 In Cuba, the government
controls both the courts and the institutions, and the centralization of power allows most of
the decisions to be made a higher level, creating significant political risk. Article 60 of the
2014 Foreign Investment Act explains the process of settling disputes, and it essentially vests
all the power into the Economic Division of the particular Provincial People’s Court.39 An
illustration of the significance of this section involves the right to terminate or renew a
contract. If the government decides that a foreign corporation has violated a section of the
foreign investment contract, the contract can be terminated, and the only legal remedy the
corporation has is to appeal the termination to the provincial court, which is an extension of
the government. Thus, the final decision will not be made by a neutral, third party.
Political risk also includes the historical acts of the government. The determination of
the sustained impact of past acts of expropriation and default play a key role in calculating
the political risk associated with investments in Cuba. While a company that has had its
assets expropriated would most likely avoid future investment, other companies that were not
directly affected by past acts of expropriation would still consider investment as long as the
reward was worth the incentive. Cuba offers a completely new market for investors, and as
such, the island compels foreign companies to invest in its potential. The financial
implications of the current United States sponsored embargo discourages firms from

37

Fukuyama, Francis. Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. New York: Free, 1995: 358.
Tomz, Michael, and Mark L. J. Wright. "Sovereign Theft: Theory and Evidence about Sovereign Default and
Expropriation." 2008: 69.
39
Law No. 118 Foreign Investment Act. National People’s Power Assembly. Mar. 29, 2014.
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investing in Cuba; however, once the government lifts it, companies will be more likely to try
and penetrate the Cuban market. The next political transition will have a tremendous effect
on the risk associated with investment. When Raul Castro steps down, his successor will
create a new perspective from which to judge the trustworthiness of investment. If risk
averse, the leader will be motivated to expropriate foreign assets in bad times; however, if the
next president does not fear risk, he or she might be willing to centralize foreign investment
in good times in order to fortify power and control.40 These considerations should be
carefully evaluated by companies looking to invest, and as such, the successor should work to
establish a reputation of trust and ethical behavior.
This literature review suggests a few economic principles that will guide the analysis
of Cuba’s foreign investment prospects. First, Cuba must build its residentiary sector, but the
focus should be on only areas of comparative advantage. Protective laws and barriers are
required to stabilize economic transition and prevent a resurgence of economic dependence.
Strategic planning by the state sector needs to be implemented in order to create incentives
for foreign investment and growth. Diversification is necessary; however, the diversity of
exports should be limited to the fields of comparative advantage. Cuba must build its social
capital. It must select an economic model that promotes the market and allows firms and
entrepreneurs to thrive.
Moreover, after making its selection, Cuba must maintain its course. Cuba has a long
history of reversing its trajectory, often relying more on idealism and less on a sound plan.
This next economic policy must be grounded in reality, and the government must show how
the revenue totals more than cost. To the outside world, Cuba must project a new self: a
country that cares about its international image. It must make timely payments on its debt,

40

Tomz, Michael, and Mark L. J. Wright. "Sovereign Theft: Theory and Evidence about Sovereign Default and
Expropriation." 2008: 106.
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eliminate its dual currency system. and join the modern world. Cuba must embrace its highly
educated population and attract investment that focuses on work that needs highly educated
labor. In addition, Cuba must develop methods to keep this population from leaving; without
its sharpest minds, Cuba will be at a major disadvantage as it reintegrates into the world
economy. While this study has primarily addresses the external sector, the social capital must
also be improved domestically in order to advance the quality of life of citizens. One of the
best options for improving the standard of living is by promoting entrepreneurship and
removing the barriers to entry.
Cuba must reexamine the progress it has made on its revolutionary goals. Through its
platform of growth with equity, Cuba has expanded the literacy rate, improved public
schooling, and advanced the healthcare sector. The next economy policy must account for
these gains, and economic growth should only be pursued when it does not force the
government to sacrifice these achievements or the equity that was created throughout the
second half of the twentieth century.

III. Historical Overview of Cuban Economic Dependency

For the past 500 years Cuba has struggled to be self-sufficient and independent, and it
has a complex history of economic dependency and monoculture exportation. During the
early history of Cuba after its discovery by Spain, the small native population was nearly
exterminated, and thus, the Spaniards created a two- class system or plantation system, which
consisted of a wealthy land-owing elite and a slave class. Since the native population had
almost totally perished as a result of disease and conquest, the Spanish had to import a huge
population of African slaves. Present-day Cuban culture and ethnicity can be traced back to
the sixteenth century with the import of African slaves. Through its global merchant fleet,
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Spain exported Cuban sugar all over the world, and by 1856 Cuban sugar dominated the
world market accounting for 25 percent of global sugar.41 This stratified system of Spanish
mercantilism essentially remained in place until the end of the nineteenth century. It
weakened slightly in 1884, however, when the world price of sugar dropped significantly,
forcing many sugar mills to declare bankruptcy.42 Seeing an investment opportunity, U.S.
firms poured millions of dollars into the Cuba’s sugar industry, cementing Cuba’s relations
with the United States. Finally, after nearly three decades of resistance against Spanish
ownership, the Cubans gained their independence in 1898 with U.S. assistance. While Cuba
legally gained full independence, it nevertheless remained heavily tied to the U.S. economy
and enjoyed little authentic economic independence.
In the late 1950s Fidel Castro led a revolt against the American-supported military
dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista. Revolution promised true independence and the end of
Cuban reliance on the United States. Following the revolution, the Cuban economy followed
cyclical transitions as the command economy made various attempts to stimulate growth and
maintain equity. Carmelo Mesa-Lago and Jorge Perez-Lopez breakdown the period from
1959 to 2012 into eight distinct cycles:
1959–1966: Although difficult to classify, this was mostly an idealist cycle, with
some facets of pragmatism particularly in 1964–1966; this period is divided into three
subcycles: market erosion, introduction of orthodox Soviet central planning, and
debate over socialist models.
1966–1970: Fidel’s adoption and radicalization of the Guevarist model, a strong
idealist cycle.
1971–1985: Total collapse of the Cuban economy and the introduction of the Soviet
timid (pre-Gorbachev) economic reform model, the first well-identified pragmatist
cycle.
1986–1990: The so-called Rectification Process, the third idealist cycle.
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1991–1996: Crisis and market-oriented reforms, the second and strongest pragmatist
cycle up to this point, under the “Special Period in Time of Peace.”
1997–2003: Slowdown and halt of the reform, a cycle of policy stagnation.
2003–2006: Reversal of reforms, the fourth idealist cycle, although weaker than
previous idealist cycles.
2007–present: Raúl Castro’s structural reforms, the third and strongest pragmatist
cycle of the revolution.43
This 50-year period of abrupt shifts in policy direction and subsequent reforms underlie a
critical set of contradictions with which the Cuban leadership has continually struggled. The
government has failed to find the right balance of economic reforms to bolster the economy,
and when changes have actually begun to work, the subsequent diminishing of ideological
fervor throughout the country have consistently prompted the government to implement often
sweeping policy reverses, eliminating the gains from the previous cycle. A more detailed
review illuminates this challenge.

First Cycle: Post-Revolution and State-Centralization 1959-1966

Between 1959 and 1962, Castro implemented various changes like the nationalization
of U.S. businesses and agrarian land reform, which further solidified Cuba’s economic break
from the U.S. Castro seized hundreds of millions of dollars of capital from American
businesses, filling the government’s coffers and delivering tremendous potential for state
production. As a way of determining the value of the expropriation and providing a legal
channel to regain losses, the United States government established the Cuban Claims
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Program in 1964 as an extension of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, and the
Cuban Claims Program met between 1966 and 1972:
During that time, it received 8,816 claims: 1,146 by U.S. corporations and 7,670 by
individual U.S. citizens. It certified 5,911 of these claims, with an aggregate amount
of $1.8 billion; denied 1,195 claims, with an aggregate amount of $1.5 billion; and
dismissed without consideration (or saw withdrawn) 1,710 other claims.44
This $1.8 billion dollars of certified claims does not include interest and represents a fair
market value estimate of the amount of seized property claimed by the Cuban government.
These claims still remain active today although many of the companies no longer exist or
have been absorbed into different corporations. The vast accumulation of wealth provided a
major advantage to a government that desired to transition to a state-planning model.
In 1962, in response to Cuba’s move to establish far-reaching trade arrangements with
the Soviet bloc and its attempt to place Soviet missiles on the island, President Kennedy
declared an executive directive that forbade U.S. commerce with Cuba and prohibited Cuban
imports. These restrictions placed extensive pressure on the Cuban economy, and Castro
quickly turned to the Soviet Union for aid. As the United States retreated from Cuba, the
Soviet Union increased its presence. Besides the $1.8 billion in expropriations, the Cuban
government also received a substantial post-revolution advantage through Soviet credits,
approximately $600 million during the period of 1959-1963.45 Fifty percent of these credits
helped finance economic development, while the other half was primarily focused on
assisting Cuba with fulfilling its trade agreements with the Soviet Union.46 Over the same
time period, other communist states offered another $157 million in credits, expanding the
development on the island.47 This source of financial credits serves as another component of
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Cuba’s advantage as it embarked on establishing a new economic plan. Limiting the analysis
of how these credits were utilized is the fact that “it is particularly difficult to evaluate the
quality of Soviet aid to Cuba because of the paucity of materials on the subject.”48 However,
with that acknowledged, the available information still allows an informed judgment on
governmental policies of the first cycle.
Cuba attempted to model its economic transition after Czechoslovakia, purchasing
industrial equipment from the country. Che Guevara spent time in Eastern Europe studying
its economic functions and manufacturing capabilities, and upon his return to Cuba, he set out
an ambitious task of diversification and import-substitution industrialization. While plans
were drawn, they were somewhat haphazard as reforms were instituted almost impulsively.49
The agrarian land reform and diversification of crops yielded unexpected downturns in the
sugar industry.50 The idealism and raw ambition combined in an attempt to overhaul
completely a capitalistic society into a state-controlled command economy. Interestingly
enough, Castro disagreed with the communist model favoring a less intense socialist model.
Nevertheless, whatever model the government found preferential did not endure.
The failure of the early transition of the economy was four-fold. First, the economic
plan was rough, vague, and even non-existent in some areas. Second, the Czech model was a
poor fit for Cuba, and following its manufacturing strategies did not promote the growth that
the leaders expected. Third, the forced transition of the agricultural sector away from sugar
and the rapid collectivization of land lacked stability and foresight, leading to significant
declines in sugar production – the main export of the time. Fourth, the Cuban government’s
political differences with the United States and its desire for equitable wealth distribution
created a mass exodus of managers and business leaders whose talent was needed during the
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transition. Although the fourth reason was not in the control of the Cuban government, the
other three factors could have been prevented with better planning.
Moreover, the economic difficulties associated with the first cycle are deeply
connected to the ideological and idealistic aspects of the revolution. Connecting these early
years to the beginning of the Cuban revolution reveals a parallel that defines Fidel Castro
during this time period. During Fidel Castro’s time in Mexico as an exile from Cuba, he met
Che Guevara, and together, the men plotted the overthrow of Batista. The plan consisted of
sailing an 82-man company aboard a yacht the revolutionaries called Granma to Cuba and
meeting up with local sympathizers to start the revolution. Batista’s men killed 75 percent of
the Granma rebels when they landed, decimating any chance Castro had of consolidating
support. This idealism and their wholly unrealistic expectations illustrate the way in which
these two revolutionary leaders thought. Luck alone and the loss of morale among Batista’s
army explains more about revolutionary victory than any other set of factors. The utter lack
of a realistic, grounded understanding of economics helps to explain why their revolutionary
economic transformations failed during the early 1960s.
After the unsuccessful first sub-cycle, a deliberative movement back to the
monoculture export of sugar occurred. In 1961, sugar production totaled 6.7 million tons, but
by 1964, total production had decreased to 3.8 million tons, a 43% reduction in output.51
Realizing the policies were unsustainable, Fidel Castro famously proclaimed that Cuba would
ramp up sugar production to 10 million tons by 1970 – a complete departure from the
revolutionary goal of economic diversification.52 At the same time, the influential inner circle
of Cuban politics diverged on strategy: one group favored a socialist transformation, and the
other leaders, inclusive of Che, supported an idealistic communist state of affairs. Ultimately,
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in 1965, Che Guevara left Cuba to join in another revolution, leaving Fidel full power of
economic decision-making.
Second Cycle: Export-Oriented

Now solely responsible for the economy, Castro introduced a new strategy of
concentrating on sugar production. Unfortunately, the increase in production barely surpassed
the production levels of 1961, and by 1970, Cuba only reached 8.5 million tons, 15 percent
less than its forecasted goal and barely above the sugar-production levels of the 1950s.
Moreover, it represents less than a 3 percent annual growth rate of sugar production during
the 1960s. Therefore, it was actually a rather small feat of economic capability, particularly
given that the regime focused all of its attention and energy on this goal. Although less
impressive with further analysis, the policy change did expand sugar production 2.5 times
from 1964-1970, illustrating, in part, the strength of export promotion.
In addition to the government’s change in focus, this period also marshaled in a new
method of economic planning. Castro articulated a new vision that incorporated Che
Guevara’s plan with his own personal philosophy, allowing him to consolidate power and
control.53 Castro delivered a series of speeches in which called on Cubans to combine the
institutional changes already in place with a revolutionary transformation of culture. He
implored each Cuban man to change the way he thinks about himself and to become “a new
man” that would volunteer his time and labor selflessly for the revolution. Fidel offered
moral incentives to men who followed their leader unquestioningly and worked hard and
sacrificed for the spirit of the revolution. Many Cubans rallied behind their charismatic
leader. Seeing the potential for an egalitarian society, the government expropriated close to
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60,000 small enterprises and rid the society of family farm collectives, reorganizing the entire
population around the public sector.54 In this idealism, Fidel developed a new economic
policy of socialism and communism combined. It did not last long, however, as the economy
quickly began to disintegrate.
Third and Fourth Cycles: Soviet Dependency
Adverse conditions that culminated in widespread economic crises pressured the
Cuban government to seek additional help from the Soviet Union, fully shifting Cuba’s
relationship with the Soviet Union to one of dependency. This new – and more extensive –
relationship of dependency sustained for 20 more years. While the relationship prominently
consisted of trade, geopolitical factors, and Cuban support of Soviet expansionism and
communist rebellions around the world helped maintain the amicable nature of the deal. In
1972 the Soviet Union granted Cuba membership in the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (CMEA).55 In this expanded trade role, the Soviet Union readily gave billions of
dollars of aid to Cuba. As Figure 1 suggests below, Cuban trade with communist countries
exploded after 1972, tripling its exports in 2 years. Such a drastic transformation shows the
direct impact of Cuba’s integration into the CMEA, and it suggests an improvement in
economic production: “Economic growth recorded the highest average annual rate,
particularly in 1971-1975, spurred by historically high world market prices for sugar.”56 On
the opposite side of this success, the Cuban government decided to invest heavily in its
production in order to export sugar to other countries. By the time the capital had been spent,
however, the market price of sugar plummeted, making the economic conditions worse for
Cuba.
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Figure 1

57

Discrepancies in the economic data of Cuba’s external sector during this time period provide
the need for verification of statistics. Figure 1 comes from a sub-committee hearing of the
United States Congress. The table has been combined with a table from Cuba’s National
Office of Statistics in order to determine validity (See Figure 2). The years 1950, 1955, 1960,
1965, 1970, and 1975 are taken from the Annual Report of the External Sector of the Cuban
Economy, which is published by the Cuban National Office of Statistics. The value of the
imports and exports are in millions of pesos. The years 1957, 1968, 1970, 1972, 1974, and
1975** are from Figure 1, which comes from a United States congressional subcommittee,
and the values are in millions of dollars. When amalgamating the tables, the 1970 values
were identical, leading to a conclusion that the measurement of pesos accurately reflects U.S.
dollars. At the time, the convertible peso did not exist, and the exchange rate between local
pesos and convertible pesos fluctuated; therefore, without comparison, that data requires
extra scrutiny. The exact match shows that there is not a problem with that year and most
likely can be generalized to the whole. Unfortunately, the 1975 preliminary exports and
imports do not align with the data from the Office of National Statistics. Since the
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subcommittee report occurred in 1976, this difference might have been corrected following
that meeting. Nonetheless, this discrepancy serves as an anecdotal evidence of the difficulties
that come with an economic analysis of this time period.

Figure 2
Cuban Foreign Trade (In Millions of Pesos/Dollars)
Years
Exports
Imports
Net Exports
1950
642
515
127
1955
594
575
19
1957
818
895
-77
1960
608
580
28
1965
691
866
-175
1968
652
1103
-451
1970*
1050
1311
-261
1972
840
1297
-457
1974
2689
2693
-4
1975
2952
3113
-161
1975**
3415
3805
-390 58

The CMEA helped Cuba escape its trade deficiency through augmented prices and
larger export deals. These major advancements in the Cuban economy posit the question:
Why did Cuba not receive admission to the CMEA prior to 1972? The Soviet Union had
considered this possibility back in 1960 at the very beginning of Castro’s anti-American
rhetoric and policies. Among the communiques sent out by the Soviet Union during 1960 was
a report to Czechoslovakia about the upcoming visit by Che Guevara.59 In the report, the
Soviet Union had a direct recommendation to Czechoslovakia if Che Guevara asked about
Cuba’s prospects of joining CMEA:
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A decision can be made only after consultations with all member countries of the
CMEA; Inform Mr. Guevara about the conditions for membership in the CMEA,
which are based on an accepted Statute of the CMEA. Emphasize that based on this
accepted Statute of the CMEA, only European countries may become members of the
Council, and that other countries can participate in the work of the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance on selected issues. Inform Mr. Guevara about the main
objectives of the CMEA, namely coordination of plans for the next 20 years.60

This report reflects the Soviet mindset toward the CMEA in 1960, and while its official
stance was to restrict the CMEA to European states, the Soviet Union still advocated for a
broad partnership with Cuba and asked the Czechoslovak trade representatives to assist in the
financing of Cuban development. However, Che, in fact, did not specifically request
membership in the CMEA because at that time the Cuban government still hoped to be able
to broadly diversify its trade relationships beyond the Soviet bloc. Moreover, a few political
disagreements, including the Soviet decision to remove the missiles from Cuba without
informing Fidel Castro, prolonged the time period before the Soviet Union finally admitted
Cuba into the CMEA. Without these political differences, the Cuba government might have
prospered much earlier, and speculatively, the economy might have been in a better position
to withstand the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s.
The trade benefits from the CMEA were substantial; however, Soviet aid outpaced
those benefits. Figure 3 compares the aid given to Cuba to the aid received by Vietnam. This
significant difference underscores the high value of Cuba’s geopolitical location and its
degree of dependency. A closer observation reveals that the Vietnamese invested their aid in
rapidly expanding sectors that produced prosperity while the Cubans failed to invest at all in
sectors that produced growth. In fact, economists have confirmed that much of the Soviet aid
was never invested in the economy at all. Certainly it was not invested in an effort to
enhance economic self-sufficiency.
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Figure 3

61

While difficult to quantify, the Soviet subsidies amounted to approximately $25
billion in aid between 1965 and 1980. The principle methods for these subsidies occurred
through the exchange of oil, nickel and sugar. In 1975 the Soviet bloc purchased sugar from
Cuba at $0.50 per pound, while the world market price of sugar hovered at around $0.05 per
pound. At its peak, Cuba produced almost 10 million tons of sugar annually, which would
equate to a subsidy of almost $9 billion. This drastic overpayment for sugar describes one
method the Soviet Union subsidized the Castro government. Real issues developed from the
rich amounts of aid that the Soviet Union gave to Cuba. First, the cost of production became
distorted. Since the Soviet Union paid a premium above the world sugar price, Cuba did not
have to compete with the price and quality of the rest of the world, leading to lags in
production. Second, the Soviet Union sold oil to the Cubans at well below the world price.
The re-exporting of oil on the world market amounted to one of the island’s top hardcurrency earners. Cuba became accustomed to re-exporting oil that it did not consume.62
This reliance on re-exportation created a high degree of dependency because the profit
depended on aid.
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Fifth and Sixth Cycles: Special Period in Time of Peace and Restructuring

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the tightening of the U.S. embargo
in 1996, Cuba became independent of influence with the exception of the negative pressure
from the embargo. The economies of the European Union and Latin America distanced
themselves from the Cuban crisis, and the island faced extreme economic perils.
Characterized as the Special Period in Time of Peace, poverty rates skyrocketed, and
economic production virtually stopped. For the first time in its history, Cuba had finally
achieved independence, and its economy was rapidly collapsing. Castro worked to motivate
Cubans to work without wage in order to fulfill the ideals of the revolution, and he labeled
these years as the “special period,” which he insisted would, through hard work, lead to
economic prosperity. He revitalized his call to each Cuban to become the “new man” and
offered moral incentives in lieu of salaries.
While the Spanish, American and Soviet periods have been addressed, the past 25
years also support the idea that the Cubans turned to other countries to make the investments.
Castro actively sought out international partners during the Special Period, and he leveraged
his shared socialist virtues with newly transitioning Latin American states. This connection
led to a lucrative partnership with Venezuela. Through a creative deal, Cuba exchanged
doctors for oil and then took a hefty cut of the doctors’ wages to fund the government. The
government opened its poorly performing industries to foreign investment and attracted
Canadian’s Sherritt Corporation to modernize its nickel mining industry.

IV. Modern-day Reforms
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Since gaining office in 2006 Raul Castro has initiated a new phase. Accelerating
privatization, that began out of necessity in the 1990s, revising foreign investment laws, and
expanding tourism has strengthened the economy slightly. His announcement that he plans to
step down in 2018 has stimulated more reforms, which has helped to build domestic
confidence in the government. Cuba’s long pre-revolutionary tradition of being highly
entrepreneurial and productive, economists hope, will contribute to the current effort to
recover. One of Cuba’s most valuable sources of hard currency is its export of human
capital. The government has for years sent abroad doctors, coaches and trainers, and other
professionals to serve the needs of other countries. The government is paid for these
services, and it pays the professionals the going wage in Cuba. Another significant source of
hard currency in Cuba are remittances sent to Cuba from Cubans and Cuban-Americans
living in the United States. The third most profitable sector is tourism. All three of these
economic sectors depend on an international flow of goods and services. The government
continues to struggle to attract investment and draw on the global supply of goods and
services, while avoiding the creation of another highly dependent economic relationship.
This historical context provides the framework for assessing the Cuban economic model and
the necessary economic changes.
The bewildering issue that continues to plague Cuba is its inefficiency and lack of
production. After extensive analyses of the Cuba economy, economists have found that 3
percent of government corporations accounted for 75 percent of the state’s profit. This
revelation remained shrouded by the dual currency system, which allowed state enterprises to
veil their profit margins and losses. By 2016, the government hoped to transition 2 million
people to non-state sectors, roughly 40 percent of the labor force.63 However, in 2014, only
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600,000 workers had been restructured to the private sector. Unfortunately, the movement of
workers to entrepreneurship did not yield the expected results: “Whereas the global average
is for one self-employed to employ five others, the situation in Cuba is completely the
opposite (only one out of five creating one additional job).”64 If Cuba had followed the global
average, there would already be 2.5 million people working in private enterprises; however,
the stifling taxes, licensing fees, and mistrust of the government have prevented this growth.
In a way, this reflects Cuba’s poor social capital as it is unable to create new jobs at the same
rate as other comparable countries.
Besides simply transitioning workers from the state sector, the government must also
address the inefficiencies and corruption found in state enterprises; for example, in 2008, the
Ministry of Labor and Social Security through an in-depth survey found that almost 50
percent of state employees were arriving to work late.65 The deeply rooted and systemic
problem of inefficiency highlights how badly the economy is performing. In 2009 the
government finally abandoned the lunch it provided to more than 3.5 million workers and
replaced it with a 15 pesos per week raise in wage, approximately $0.60.66 While a small
raise relative to the U.S. dollar, the increase was rather significant since most Cuban workers
received less than 500 pesos a month. The shift also foreshadowed a movement by the
government to eliminate underperforming public services in favor of public sector growth.
Although reports might not publically suggest the support of private entrepreneurship and
many of the laws and taxes hamper private economic growth and employment, the
fundamental shift expanded business opportunities for local restaurants that do not target
tourists.
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V. Prospects of Foreign Investment

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Cuba has made various attempts to garner
foreign direct investment in order to replace its largest trading partner, but for every
promotional action it has made, the government has regressed and made investments riskier.
The government tends to redo its foreign investment policy every 5-10 years, and it has
exercised its prerogative in canceling partnerships after the initial contractual period finishes.
For example, in 2002, Cuba had over 400 joint ventures with foreign entities, but by 2008, it
retrenched and canceled contracts with half of the foreign corporations, citing a variety of
reasons for the cancellations.67 In addition, when state enterprises feel threatened by the
competition of foreign investment, they often exert influence over other enterprises,
ultimately causing the joint venture’s electricity rates to spike, rent to be increased, and visas
to be denied.68 If these issues are not enough to discourage investment, a comparison to the
rest of South America illuminates other reasons to invest elsewhere. Cuba’s 2014 Foreign
Investment Act requires a special approval process, which has been previously explained, yet
none of the 14 Latin American countries surveyed by Investing Across Borders in 2010 have
special hurdles for foreign investment.69 Additionally, these countries fully opened most of
their economic sectors to foreign investment without limiting the equity arrangement of
foreign entities; however, a few sectors like electricity, banking, and telecommunications
were noted as areas that the governments are more likely to protect.70 This contrasts
negatively with the rules and limitations that Cuba places on foreign investment. Such
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actions limit profit and diminish the incentives in investing. While the media has recently
given great press coverage of the possibilities for American and other international
corporations in Cuba, the articles fail to give an accurate picture of the volatile and secretive
climate that shrouds foreign investments. A relevant conclusion made by the Investing
Across Borders 2010 study was that “Easily accessible and reliable information and efficient
and predictable actions by public institutions help create a business environment conducive to
investment.”71 This recommendation and conclusion helps recognize the need for strong
social capital to attract foreign direct investment. A country that lacks international trust and
that operates under a cloud of secrecy tends to foster an environment that is hostile to
investment. As Cuba looks to expand the foreign investment on the island, it must work to
compete with countries that offer investment relationships based on trust, adding another
difficult impediment of economic growth.
In The New Economy: What Roles for Foreign Investment?, Richard Feinberg
attempts to assess the Cuban climate for foreign direct investment in 2012. First, Feinberg
divides the past 50 years into 5 distinct periods of the government’s policies toward foreign
direct investment: 1) revolutionary period of expropriation and nationalism; 2) the postSoviet phase of attracting FDI and liberalizing the economy; 3) a movement to return to a
closed system through the cancellation of contracts; 4) a decision to create a “New
Socialism” by focusing on attracting socialist countries to invest like Venezuela, China, and
Brazil; and 5) an ambivalent period that is characterized by a transition away from historic
models toward sweeping economic reforms.72 Categorizing these phases show a progression
and regression of policies – continual shifts and counterbalances to change. The
government’s decisions reflect its desperation to maintain the revolutionary spirit of the
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country and its pragmatism in times of need. The major questions that arise relate to what is
next. Does the ambivalence change to complete acceptance of trade and liberalization? If so,
would a reform of openness last, or would a period of retrenchment follow? Although future
predictions of policy decisions requires some guesswork, the historic precedent and current
attitude toward foreign investment allows for a consideration of what will occur next,
acknowledging that a political transition might alter any current framework for assessment. In
the face of this uncertainty, however, the Cuban economy is still severely underperforming:
agriculture production is below 1988 levels, and national savings and investment only
account for 10 percent of GDP, lagging the Latin American average by 10 percent.73
Feinberg’s case study of 7 joint ventures in Cuba presents some of the advantages and
disadvantages of foreign investment in Cuba.74 While the potential industries for investment
are not surprising, the anecdotal examples reinforce common presuppositions. Tobacco,
nickel, gas, tourism and agriculture are all areas that Cuba sought to improve its production
and quality. Beginning in 1995, the government felt pressure to open up these areas of its
economies in order to bring hard currency to the island. Minimizing imports and maximizing
exports appears to be a consistent theme in Feinberg’s paper, and it highlights the
government’s scrupulous approach to attracting partners who have a net positive impact on
Cuba’s hard currency reserves. Almost every survey of foreign investments in Cuba critically
evaluates the difficulties that are associated with the process. As Feinberg notes in the case
studies he presents, the Cuban government consistently make business more difficult and
uncertain, and they keep a sizeable portion of the profits through currency conversions and
their joint stake.75 While businessmen are optimistic about a complete transition in Cuba and
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the opening up for investment, the past should not be overlooked, and while the more intense
example is the expropriation that occurred in the 1960s, Cuba still institutes policies that
forces companies to give high percentages of their earnings to the government. One example
of how Cuba accesses these earnings is through its method of collecting and then converting
wages. The government receives payment of its workers in convertible pesos, but it pays
them in local currency, which accounts for a 90 percent tax on labor.76 A study in 2000 by
the United Nations found that the costs of Cuban workers in free trade zones were on average
$1.75 an hour compared to the cheaper rate of workers in the Dominican Republic of $0.94
per hour.77 This comparison reveals that foreign corporations paid an 85 percent premium for
Cuban workers in contrast to workers in the Dominican Republic. This sizeable difference
adds to policy changes that Cuba must endure to become a competitive market
internationally.
While expediency and efficiency have been addressed, in 2012, the Cuban
government involved a multi-step process for foreign direct investment, which led to scrutiny
by multiple government organizations. For the most part, it appears to be in place today;
however, each business seems to have a different timeline in approval. First, the corporation
must apply for a joint venture with a particular Cuban government agency, and second, the
company must address approval from Ministry of International Commerce and Foreign
Investment.78 This step will lead to consultation of the banking and finance branches of the
government; in addition, a recommendation will then be made to the Executive Committee of
the Council of Ministers. Finally, upon acceptance, the proposal will be put into action, but
the timeline appears unclear. Although the law requires a 60-day response, the process can
easily be prolonged because of the various obstacles in the formal procedures. Fortunately,
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the new law has improved the transparency and possibility of acceptance by including over
150 potential joint ventures. The new investment law technically allows for a completely
private venture, but that has not yet occurred since its passage, reflective of the central
government’s desire to influence and control all economic decisions.
Cuba’s past 25 years have been characterized by economic crises and difficulties.
However, as the Cuban government looks to transform the economy, it must be careful not to
sacrifice the successes of the revolution along the way – chiefly the equity and
socioeconomic improvements. As Vietnam has been seen as a model, examining the impact
of the economic transformation on its society has a clear relation to Cuba’s future. A key
characteristic of the Vietnamese transition related to its shift in policies from an equitable
socialism to a market-driven liberalization, emblematic of this change was the reduction of
the tariffs, which opened Vietnam up for investment: “By the mid-1980s tariff rates began to
steadily fall, with the average at 85 percent, reaching 6 percent in 2002 and only 2 percent [in
2014].”79
To be clear, Vietnam followed a path of development that emphasized economic
growth over social equity, contrary to the Cuban government’s stance on growth except
emergent crises.80 Thus, as Cuba looks to the Vietnamese model, it should forecast the effect
of some of the policy initiatives on social equity as the inequity in Vietnam skyrocketed after
reforms. Concurrently, the agricultural production tripled in a period of two decades and the
GDP increased 4 times over its 1980 value.81 Thus, the advantages of rapid economic growth
must be weighed against the reality that if 4-5 percent growth rates are to occur as Cuban
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economists project, the social equality of the state will most likely be an afterthought. Omar
Everleny’s perspective on Vietnam as a model for Cuba does not completely agree with this
critique: “Vietnam has been able to introduce the market into its model and has become an
economy with high rates of growth, improving the welfare of its citizens, and becoming a
leader in world exports.”82 This analysis provides that the economic growth will be widely
dispersed, leading to an improvement in the standard of living for most citizens. However,
current trends suggest that this might not be the case. Newspapers already cover the rise of
inequality in Cuba, connecting it to President Obama’s increase in remittances allowed
annually and the Cuban government’s easement of restrictions against private enterprise.83
As Cubans receive cash inflows from relatives in the United States, they have the opportunity
to make strategic investments that are helping them become wealthy elites, and as this is
happening, new tiers of classes are beginning to emerge. Some level of equality may have to
be sacrificed in order to attain a higher standard of living for all citizens.

VI. Conclusion

While Cuba faces crippling obstacles and some serious disadvantages, including a lack of
trust, a poor national infrastructure, an abysmal technological grid, and a very low level of
worker productivity, it has the ability to reform both its infrastructure and technology in the
coming years, and as it opens its shores to the international community and transitions its
leadership, some of these issues will diminish in their intensity. In this context, a
comprehensive study of the functions of the Cuban economy is critical as Cuba continues to
develop and seek international investment. However, from this study, a few observations can
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be made about the next steps of Cuba’s economic transition. A key comparative advantage
Cuba possesses is its highly trained and educated population, combined with its investments
in healthcare. Its human capital will promote investments by firms that need specialized
labor, and as such, Cuba should continue to invest in higher education, while also working to
attract these firms to the island. The government must continue its course to attract
investment by acting as a better steward to corporations who apply for contracts. By
eliminating the dual currency system, the government will reduce the tax it takes from wages,
which will lead to a reduction in the cost of labor, making Cuba more competitive
internationally. State-owned enterprises need to do a better job of welcoming foreign entities
rather than discriminating against them, reducing the amount of unequal treatment. Moreover,
the barriers should be eliminated in sectors the government does not have a vested interest in
protecting. An example where high tariffs might be beneficial is agriculture, but at the same
time, the government should offer tax incentives to local citizens who make the land more
productive and profitable. When the embargo ends, Cuba should be wary of the United States
influence, maintaining safeguards against dependency. While this might sacrifice growth, it
will protect the country against a new wave of economic dependency, and through a
thoughtful economic plan, Cuba will be in a better position to integrate into the world market.
Social capital matters, and goodwill has a high intrinsic economic value. The next political
leaders should be mindful of how their actions will be perceived by the international
community because it will directly affect the levels of international investment. Another way
of promoting better relations would be to switch dispute resolution to an international
arbitrator for the next ten years in order to foster more international trust. Cuba must also
manage its debt and find ways to settle old claims in order to integrate successfully into the
global economy. If Vietnam is the model that the government follows, the equity and gains of
the revolution should be protected by not just focusing on growth. Cuba’s future is uncertain
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both economically and politically; therefore, the decisions made by Cuban leaders today will
have a major impact on the country that Cuba becomes.
Anecdote
During my time in Cuba, I spent a week on a cross-country tour of the island, and my
academic cohort had a native Cuban guide that provided us with ample information about the
politics, history, culture, and economy. While much of the tour seemed to be regurgitated
facts, stories, and jokes, one of my exchanges with the guide captured what I believe to be an
overwhelming sentiment on the island. The highways were in ill-repair, and while many
developing nations have poorly constructed national infrastructures for transportation, Cuba’s
neglect appeared to have gone on for over fifty years. When I probed the tour guide about
how the government would finance the project of rebuilding, the answer was quick,
seemingly unrehearsed: “Someone else will pay for it. We need another country to build
these highways and fix our buildings. Cuba is broke. The government has no money to do it.”
Cuba’s foreign debt echoes this statement, but the tour guide’s admission points to a more
glaring critique on the Cuban society. For five hundred years, Cuba has been accustomed to
receiving vast injections of foreign capital and investment. The revolution promised
independence, but it did not deliver.
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